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THE ROME STATUTE AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW [2006]1
"[W]hosoever killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the
earth, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and whosoever saveth the life of one, it
shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.”1
“Justice, justice. shall you pursue”2
“In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organized robbery?”3
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of international human rights law, generally, and international criminal law,
specifically, has seen the construction of specialized criminal tribunals and courts.4 The progression from
Nuremburg to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) illustrates the development of judicial concepts
and tools relating to international criminal law in order to combat transnational crimes and prevent
impunity. The construction of specialized domestic and hybrid courts in Sierra Leone,5 Cambodia,6 East
Timor,7 Iraq,8 and Kosovo9 demonstrate that the notion of “international” criminal courts has pervaded
“domestic” boundaries.10 The universal nature of international crimes is slowly penetrating state borders
and raising questions on universal jurisdiction,11 immunity and amnesty,12 and humanitarian
1 Qu’ran, Al-Ma’ida 5:32.
2 Deuteronomy 16:20.
3 St. Augustine, the City of God, bk. IV, ch. 4 (Marcus Dods trans., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1948)
4 See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003); BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE (1980); JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PRACTICE (2003); LEILA N. SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2002); STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998).
5 S.C. Res. 1315, P 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,
Aug. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20promulgated%20(Eng%20trans%206%20Sept%202001.pdf
(English translation); Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone P 1, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html.
6 U.N. Doc. A/53/850-S/1999/231 (Mar. 16, 1999); Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for
Cambodia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 948, 948-953 (1999); Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
2 (1993).
7 S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
8 Paul Bremer, III, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, Order No. 48, Delegation of Authority
Regarding Establishment of an Iraqi Special Tribunal (Dec. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST_and_Appendix_A.pdf.
9 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (establishing the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
10 See generally Jenia I. Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2005); Mark S. Ellis,
The International Criminal Court and Its Implications for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215,
216 (2002).
11 See generally Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735 (2005);
Rodney Neufeld, Universal Jurisdiction in Prosecution World Leaders, 8 Human Rights Tribune/Tribune des droits humains
(2001); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Steps Back, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 373 (2004); Antonio
Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 589 (2003); STEPHEN MACEDO, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES (2003); Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs, The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction 28 (2001); ALAN BAKER, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2001).
12 See generally CHARLES VILLA-VICENCIO & ERIK DOXTADER, THE PROVOCATIONS OF AMNESTY: MEMORY, JUSTICE,
AND IMPUNITY (2003); BEN CHIGARA, AMNESTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
NATIONAL AMNESTY LAWS (2003); Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing Jurisprudence on Amnesty, 20
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 843 (1998).
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intervention.13 As international crimes become more pervasive and international interest in preventing
impunity becomes more pressing, the legal limits of personal (ratione personae) and subject matter
(ratione materiae) jurisdiction are at the forefront of academic debate.
Following the creation of international criminal tribunals in Rwanda14 and Yugoslavia,15 the
international community ratified the Rome Statute,16 verifying the establishment of the ICC and marking
a historical step in the development of international criminal law. Since the ICC’s creation, scholars have
renewed debates on the viability of customary international law,17 the scope of the “laws of nations,”18
and the obligations of nation states to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere, aut judicare) global criminals
while eliminating the problem of impunity.19 At the focal point of these discussions is the legitimacy of
the ICC’s power to adjudicate and prescribe punishment for nationals of countries not party to the Rome
Statute.20
The Rome Statute permits the ICC to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over individuals who
engage in war crimes,21 genocide,22 crimes against humanity,23 and crimes of aggression.24 However,
under Article 13, the ICC may only exercise personal jurisdiction over persons referred by the Security
Council under Chapter VII, or over nationals of a state party, or persons whose alleged criminal conduct
occurred on the territory of a state party.25
The nationality and territoriality requirements place jurisdictional limitation, intended to prevent
the ICC from exercising personal jurisdiction without boundaries. As Michael Scharf, professor of
international law at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy notes:
“the drafters [of the Rome Statute] did not view the consent of the state of territoriality or
nationality as necessary as a matter of international law to confer jurisdiction on the
court. Rather, they adopted the consent regime as a limit to the exercise of the court's
13 See generally J. L. HOLZGREFE & ROBERT O. KEOHANE, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND
POLITICAL DILEMMAS (2003); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001); ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
14 U.N. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. (1994) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
15 U.N. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 827 (1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia).
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
17 See Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 817 (2005); Mahnoush H.
Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 24-25 (1999); contra Avi Singh, Note,
Criminal Responsibility for Non-State Civilian Superiors Lacking De Jure Authority: A Comparative Review of the Doctrine of
Superior Responsibility and Parallel Doctrines in National Criminal Laws, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 267, 276 (2005)
(noting "An international treaty, the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) is limited in its valuable
contribution to customary international law as it is not ratified by, inter alia, the United States, China, and India."); Madeline
Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 42 (2001) [hereinafter
High Crimes and Misconceptions]; David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
12, 15 (1999) [hereinafter US and the ICC].
18 Congresses authority to delegate prosecutory power to an international court, including the ICC, falls under Art. I,
Sec. 8 of the Constitution, which provides that “The Congress shall have Power To define and punish offenses against the Law of
Nations.” See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946); Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an
International Criminal Court, 1 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73, 73 (1995) (“Constitutional objections [to the ICC] are simply
poorly reasoned”).
19 See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR
PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW [AUT DEDERE, AUT JUDICARE] (1995).
20 See David Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, The International Criminal Court: The
Challenge of Jurisdiction, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 26, 1999).
21 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at arts. 5(1)(c), 8.
22 Id. at arts. 5(1)(a), 6.
23 Id. at arts. 5(1)(b), 7.
24 Id. at art. 5(1)(d).
25 Id. at art. 13.
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inherent jurisdiction as a politically expedient concession to the sovereignty of states in
order to garner broad support for the statute.26
While the consent regime was intended to provide jurisdictional limitations, it has nonetheless come
under substantial scrutiny by non-party states who claim that their nationals can be suspect to the ICC’s
jurisdiction without their consent.27 Presumably a non-party national can be subject to the ICC’s
jurisdiction either by referral from the Security Council, or referral by the state of territoriality. Thus,
there is the distinct possibility that the ICC may have prescriptive and adjudicative power over foreign
military or civilians operating abroad even if the state of nationality has not consented to the Court’s
jurisdiction.28 Beside policy considerations concerning state sovereignty29 and exposure of military
figures to politically motivated prosecutions,30 the core legal arguments posited by opponents to the ICC
is that rights and obligations cannot be created for third states without their consent.31 This paper will
evaluate, dissect, and refute the legal critics leveled against the Rome Statutes powers of adjudication and
prescription.
Part I will describe the principle of pacta tertiis and its application to treaty-based Courts.32 The
pacta tertiis principle has been evoked by non-party States to the Rome Statute in order to prevent the
ICC’s application of jurisdiction to their nationals.33 The pacta tertiis principle prevents treaties from
modifying the legal interests of third parties.34 However, the principle has changed over time and has
given rise to exceptions, including one based on customary international law and jus cogens norms.35
Part II determines whether the pacta tertiis principle is applicable to the Rome Statute.36 First,
there is a presumption under international law that all forms of jurisdiction are valid, unless it violates a
norm of customary international law.37 This paper questions whether states have a legal right to see their
nationals free from “exorbitant” jurisdiction.38 The notion of “exorbitant jurisdiction” is more of a
political than legal interest.39 Moreover, nationality jurisdiction is not exclusive, but concomitant with
26 Michael Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party states: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 77 (2001).
27 Giovanni Conso, The Basic Reasons for US Hostility to the ICC in Light of the Negotiating History of the Rome
Statute, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 314 (2005); David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 86 (2002); Hirad Abtahi, The Islamic Republic of Iran and the ICC, 3 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 635, 643 (2005);
Usha Ramanathan, India and the ICC, 3 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 627, 627 (2005); LIN XIN & LIU NANLAI, STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 253-54 (1999) (noting that China’s refusal to ratify the Rome Statute is partly based on its view that “[t]he
jurisdiction of the ICC is not based on the principle of voluntary acceptance”).
28 See Scheffer, US and the ICC, supra note 17, at 18 (listing US concerns that their nationals would potentially be
subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction when operating in foreign countries who have ratified the Rome Statute.)
29 See generally Michael J. Struett, The Transformation of State Sovereign Rights and Responsibilities Under the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 179 (2005); Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Newton, Comparative
Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent With the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV.
20 (2001).
30 See Todd Prichard, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Should the United States Sign on the
Dotted Line?, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 727, 738-42 (2003); Evo Popoff, Inconsistency and Impunity in
International Human Rights Law: Can the International Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto
Pinochet Cases, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 363, 392-93 (2001) (discussing the United States opposition to the ICC on the
basis that it would leave soliders to politically motivated prosecutions).
31 See Scheffer, US and the ICC, supra note 17, at 18; David J. Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective on the
International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001).
32 See infra, text accompanying notes 49-76.
33 See infra, text accompanying notes 51-56.
34 See infra, text accompanying notes 49-56.
35 See infra, text accompanying notes 62-76.
36 See infra, text accompanying notes 77-103.
37 See infra, text accompanying notes 77-94.
38 See infra, text accompanying notes 95-103.
39 See infra, text accompanying notes 95-101.
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territorial jurisdiction.40 Thus, the Rome Statute does not modify the legal rights of non-party States per
se.
41
Assuming that the Rome Statute does modify such rights, Part III looks at to whether the
customary international law exception to the pacta tertiis principle is applicable.42 There are several legal
grounds of jurisdiction under international criminal law.43 Proponents to the Rome Statute argue that
universal jurisdiction over international crimes and territorial jurisdiction have reached the status of
customary international law.44 Opponents to the Rome Statute argue that an international court exercises
delegated jurisdiction which differs from domestic jurisdiction.45 In the view of its opponents, delegated
jurisdiction requires the consent of the state of nationality even where the domestic state would otherwise
be capable of exercising jurisdiction itself.46 This paper argues that under customary international law, an
international court is capable of exercising jurisdiction a state would otherwise be capable of exercising
itself.47 Thus, exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC delegated by states parties is grounded under customary
international law even where the state of nationality has not consented.48
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF PACTA TERTIIS
The Rome Statute is a multi-lateral treaty and is subject to the laws of treaties.49 As such, the
Rome Statute can only be enforced res inter alios acta, as between the parties party to the treaty. This
can be contrasted with the international tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, which were created by the
Security Council’s Chapter VII powers and thus bind all states party to the United Nations Charter.50 In
order to understand the legitimacy of the Rome Statute’s legal grounds it is important to conceptualize the
importance of non-parties and third parties under treaty law.
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), reflecting
the customary principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt,51 states, “a treaty does not create either an
obligation or rights for a third state without its consent.”52 In other words, “a treaty applies only between
the parties to it.”53 The principle of pacta tertiis is intended to prevent agreements between states from
violating the right of sovereignty and independence of third states.54 Subsequently, a treaty must leave a
non-party unaffected. Corollary to the principle of pacta tertiis, a treaty and its interpretations may not
40 See infra, text accompanying notes 144-147.
41 See infra, text accompanying notes 101-103.
42 See infra, text accompanying notes 104-195.
43 See infra, text accompanying notes 105-111.
44 See infra, text accompanying notes 117-124.
45 See infra, text accompanying notes 112-115.
46 See infra, text accompanying notes 162-195.
47 See infra, text accompanying notes 143-161.
48 See infra, text accompanying notes 160-161.
49 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at preamble.
50 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, [hereinafter United Nations Charter] art. 39; see
also infra, text accompanying notes 164-180 (discussing the different legal implications between the ICTY/R and the ICC as
related to the Security Council’s ability to confer jurisdiction under Chapter VII.)
51 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 27-29 (May
25); Territorial Jurisdiction of the River Oder Commission (U.K., Czech., Den., Fr., Germany, Swed. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 23, at 19-22 (Sept. 10); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46,
at 141 (June 7); Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 127, 136-42 (May 26); North Sea Continental Shelf
(F.R.G. v. Den. and F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 26 (Feb. 20) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf].
52 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S., [hereinafter Vienna Convention] art. 34;
see also LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 309, 310 (1961).
53 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 598 (6th ed. 2003).
54 See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (1993) (“The pacta tertiis rule is founded upon
the Roman law analogy to contract and the principles of independence, consensuality, and sovereign equality of States.”).
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alter the legal rights of non-parties without their consent.55 Interestingly, the principle of pacta tertiis was
formulated to prevent the world’s great powers from being bound to treaties not formally party to while at
the same time binding weaker states through a number of exceptions.56
Although, the principle of pacta tertiis has reached the status of customary international law,57 it
does not categorically exclude the creation of obligation or altering of third party rights. The pactaa
tertiis rule is not absolute. While it is true that the pacta tertiis requirement reflect the rigidity of
demarcations between treaty parties and non-parties, the Vienna Convention was additionally intended to
provide needed flexibility in order to bind third States to international norms.58 The prevailing doctrine of
positivism commands respect for sovereignty and fairness between states.59 However, the Vienna
Convention reflects equal concern that violations of customary international law, particularly jus cogens
offences,60 do not receive impunity.61
The maxim of pacta tertiis is modified by article 38 of the Vienna Convention, which does not
preclude “a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of
international law.”62 Insomuch that the Vienna Convention intended to modify the pacta tertiis rule, it is
clear that States are not given full rein to exercise their legal interests in any matter on the basis of
sovereignty.63 Just as the original understanding of pacta tertiis arose from notions of independence and
sovereign equality, the Vienna Convention sought to limit the absolute role of bi-literalism by reconciling
them with overall international interests. As Christine Chinkin notes:
“the effect of treaties on third parties cannot be determined merely by the formal
application of specified rules of treaty law…Instead third party claims must be analysed
to determine their factual context, the appropriate policies, and the applicable law.”64
The Vienna Convention deviated from the original understanding of pacta tertiis by incorporating
provisions on customary international law and jus cogens65 and by drawing distinctions between non-
55 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties with Commentaries, II YEARBOOK OF THE INT'L L. COMM'N 226 (1966) (Commentary to Draft Art. 30, "General Rule
Regarding Third states"); Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 842 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
56 See CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 27; see infra, text accompanying notes 62-64 (discussing the “customary law”
exception to the pacta tertiis principle).
57 Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev/1 (1966); German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia (Germany v. Polish Republic), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 7, at 29; Cf. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and
Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 5, at 27-28; Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Order,
1929 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 23, at 19-22; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 46, at
141; Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg., U.S. v Bulg., U.K. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 127, 138; North Sea Continental
Shelf, supra note 51, at 25-27, 41, 46; Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 577-578; Reports of the
Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev/1 (1966)
58 See CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 134.
59 See generally Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism,
50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1997); Daniel C.K. Chow, A Pragmatic Model Of Law, 67 WASH. L. REV. 755 (1992).
60 It is important to note that not all principles of customary international law need to be jus cogens norms; while all jus
cogens are principles of customary international law. Jus cogens norms can be understood as higher levels of custom which are
binding on all states, “even those which do not agree with them.” Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-15 (9th
Cir. 1992); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 fn. 14 (9th Cir. 2002). In contrast, States that persistently object to
customary principles of international law are not bound by them. This exception is inapplicable to jus cogens norms.
61 Whereas traditional notions of “territoriality” guided the “Westphalian” state, broader jurisdictional doctrines became
standard in order to incorporate the problems facing courts seeking to exercise jurisdiction over nationals who commit crimes
elsewhere. As states interacted with one another, a consensus grew between states that there existed crimes that by their very
nature affected the interests of the world (delicti jus gentium). See Nuremburg International Military Tribunal: Judgment and
Sentence, 41 A.J.I.L. 172, 221 (1947) (“individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of
obedience imposed by the individual State”).
62 Vienna Convention, supra note 52, at art. 38.
63 CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 35-39.
64 Id. at 38.
65 Vienna Convention, supra note 52, at art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law.”); Vienna Convention, supra note 52, at art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of
general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”).
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parties and third parties. As such, even states that have not ratified a particular treaty are not devoid of
obligations. As signatories, States possess the obligation to refrain from any act which would defeat the
“object and purpose” of the treaty.66 In addition, a right or obligation that reaches the level of jus cogens
creates erga omnes obligations that bind all members of the international community.67
Customary international law is rooted on the principle that certain rights or obligations are so
widely accepted by nation-states, that all states are bound regardless of whether or not they have agreed
by formal ratification.68 Custom is one of the primary sources of international law69 and binds all states,
except those which have “persistently objected” against its affirmation.70 In order for a right or obligation
to rise to the level of custom, they must generally meet two recognized requirements: widespread state
practice71 and opinio juris.72 Opinio juris is evidence that states act or refrain from acting in a manner
because they believe there is a legal obligation to behave that way.73
The signing and ratifying of an international convention or treaty by a multitude of States fulfils
the elements of custom.74 Thus, rules embodied in treaties can alter the rights of non-party states if they
reflect customary principles of international law. As the International Law Commission notes in their
report to the General Assembly:
“A principle or rule of customary international law may be embodied in a bipartite or
multipartite agreement so as to have, within the stated limits, conventional force for the
States parties to the agreement so long as the agreement is in force; yet it would continue
to be binding as a principle or rule of customary international law for other States.”75
The Rome Statute, thus, would have binding effect even on non-state parties if it embodies a rule or
principle of customary international law. In general, the Rome Statute as a whole is unlikely, at this time,
to embody principles of customary international law.76 For purposes of this paper, however, it is only
important to evaluate whether the Rome Statute’s provisions on jurisdiction are reflective of customary
principles of international law.
66 Vienna Convention, supra note 52, at art. 18; See also BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 603 (“…[S]ignature qualifies the
signatory state to proceed to ratification, acceptance, or approval and creates an obligation of good faith to refrain from acts
calculated to frustrate the objects of the treaty.”).
67 See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 126 (Feb. 3) at
¶ 60 (jus cogens obligations create obligations erga omnes.); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) at ¶ 42 (holding that obligations erga omnes are binding on all States and opposable against any State); See
generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, [Obligatio Erga Omnes] 59-AUT
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW [INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW] 698-704 (2003).
68 There are a number of ICJ cases which have illustrated the binding nature of customary international law: Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda), 2005 ICJ LEXIS 1, 172-73 (Dec. 19) at ¶ 219; Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua [Nicaragua] (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97¶ 184 (June 27); North Sea
Continental Shelf, supra note 51, at ¶ 27.
69 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, art. 38(1)(b); BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 4.
70 See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 10-11 (“Evidence of objection must be clear and there is probably a presumption of
acceptance which is to be rebutted. The toleration of the persistent objector is explained by the fact that ultimately custom
depends on the consent of states.”).
71 See generally THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 22-23 (2nd
ed. 1990); Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. OF INT'L
L. 23 (1965).
72 See BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supra note 71, at 5-11; IVAN SHEARER, STARK’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-34 (11th ed.
1994); MARK VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 42 ¶ 56 (2d ed. 1997); Asylum (Colum. v. Peru), 1949
I.C.J. 267, 276-277 (Dec. 17); North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 51, at, 43 ¶ 74; Nicaragua, supra note 68, at 98 ¶ 186
(June 27); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (rev’d on other grounds, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal.
2000)).
73 See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 8. To determine whether there is opinio juris, Courts look to legislative records,
declarations by state representatives, or diplomatic practices as evidence.
74 See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 51, at 38, 42-44.
75 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 364, 368, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
76 See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 67, at 262.
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II. A CONTEXTUAL APPLICATION OF PACTA TERTIIS
Opponents to the Rome Statute have four elements to their pacta tertiis argument: First, states
have a legal interest to see their nationals free from exorbitant jurisdiction. Second, the ICC’s jurisdiction
is exorbitant when exercised against non-party nationals that have not consented. Third, exercise of this
jurisdiction would affect a state’s legal interest without its consent and thus violate the pacta tertiis
principle. Lastly, there is no custom when the Rome Statute does not, per se, impose obligations on
non-party states by providing rights over their nationals. By analysing each of these arguments, it is clear
that the pacta tertiis principle does not prohibit the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction against non-party
nationals.
A. The presumption of legality under S.S. Lotus
There is a fundamental principle of international law that States can exercise any type of
jurisdiction as long as they do not violate customary rules of international law. International law does
not prohibit the application of a state’s prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction over non-citizens or acts
committed outside of its territory.77 There is a presumption that all forms of jurisdiction are legitimate so
long as they do not violate a prohibitive rule in international law.78 In one of the most important cases on
the international exercise of jurisdiction, the Permanent Court of International Justice held in S.S. Lotus
that “restrictions upon the independence of states cannot ... be presumed.”79 States have “a wide measure
of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.”80 As such, every state remains
“free to adopt the jurisdictional principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”81 The exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over non-citizens does not violate a state’s international obligations, such as the duty
to respect the sovereignty of other states.82 Thus, by adopting a Lotus inquiry, “the question is not
whether international law or precedent exists permitting an ICC with this type of jurisdictional reach…,
but rather whether any international legal rule exists that would prohibit it.”83
Opponents to the ICC reject validity of the Lotus doctrine by citing its contentious nature.84 At the
time of its publication, the Lotus doctrine divided the Permanent Court of International Justice and led to
significant academic opposition.85 Modern trends similarly dictate against the Lotus doctrine. There are
clearly rules of permissible criminal jurisdictional conduct. Almost universally, all criminal courts have
grounded jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality and nationality.86 Even the “effects” doctrine, as
implicated in Lotus, is permissive because it implicates national and territorial concerns.87 However, the
77 S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7)[hereinafter S.S. Lotus].
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 20; see also Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal Law
and the Ad hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127, 137 (1995) (“…under the doctrine of the
Lotus decision, the idea that restrictions on the sovereignty of states ought not to be presumed has continuing vitality, especially
in the criminal law context.”).
83 Scharf, supra note 26, at 73.
84 See Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 17, at 48; Jon Stephens, Note, Don't Tread on Me: Absence
of Jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court over the U.S. and Other Non-Signatory States, 52 NAVAL L. REV. 151, 169
(2005).
85 BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 302 n. 24.
86 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§402 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT THIRD].
87 In Lotus, the PCIJ went so far as to infer the existence of “effects jurisdiction” from general custom on objective
territorial jurisdiction. S.S. Lotus, supra note 77, at 18, 29. See also Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 17, at
48. (“After articulating the broad ‘Lotus principle’…the court proceeded to base its decision, upholding a challenged exercise of
jurisdiction, largely on an argument that the jurisdiction asserted was a form of territorial jurisdiction.”).
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Lotus principle, if read to its logical end, would permit any exercise of jurisdiction absent universal
objection. Yet every treaty and law providing for criminal jurisdiction clearly outlines modes of
permissible and impermissible jurisdiction.88 In fact, the “categories” of criminal jurisdiction are very
well defined and often considered “exclusive.”89 Even arguments for universal jurisdiction do not
presume that it is permissible by virtue of the Lotus doctrine. Rather, proponents of universal jurisdiction
argue that it is based on the universal nature of jus cogens crimes and the international interest in
preventing their impunity.90 Thus, instead of viewing universal jurisdiction presumptively, proponents
develop the principle doctrinally.
The rejoinder is that the Lotus doctrine is well accepted under international law91 and has been
specifically evoked to justify jurisdiction, including the Nuremburg trials.92 Even though states have
articulated specific jurisdictional limitations, this comports less with a rejection of Lotus but more with
self-imposed restrictions consistent with domestic concepts of justice and due process.93 Constraints on
international jurisdiction are bargained for and political and in no way reflect exclusive norms of criminal
prescription or adjudication. While it is true that authors and scholars list varied forms of “accepted”
criminal jurisdiction, such lists are not indicative of exclusivity, but rather are evidence of common and
generally accepted jurisdictional modes.
That being said, it is more likely that the Lotus principle is inapplicable in this setting. First, the
Lotus principle has clearly been contested by a large number of States and heavily disputed by publicists.
It is unlikely that the principle represents a general principle of international law or reflective of
customary international law. Second, the Lotus principle was delivered in the context of a state exercising
national jurisdiction. International courts are vastly difficult in their roles and abilities and it is
questionable as to whether principles relating to national courts apply to international bodies.94 Lastly,
while the Lotus principle itself is unclear, the pacta tertiis principle is well preserved under customary
international law. When the two are at odds, as is the case here, the rule with greater international
acceptance and opinio juris should prevail.
88 Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 167 (1972-73). (“what is significant
is the fact that writers almost always list specific heads of jurisdiction, thereby implying that all other types of jurisdiction are
illegal, instead of simply stating the general presumption that all types of jurisdiction are legal and then listing specific heads of
jurisdiction which are proved to be illegal.”); Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 17, at 48.
89 See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 254-55, 257 (1991).
90 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary
Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 82 (2001) (“universal jurisdiction has become the preferred technique by those seeking to prevent
impunity for international crimes”); Fiona McKay, U.S. Unilateralism and International Crimes: The International Criminal
Court and Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 462 (2004) (“Customary international law also permits states to cooperate in
combating impunity for crimes under international law, including exercising criminal jurisdiction.”); William W. Burke-White, A
Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-20 (“universal
jurisdiction is likely to play a significant role in the future enforcement of international criminal law”).
91 Akehurst, supra note 88, at 177 (concluding that customary international law imposes no limits on civil jurisdiction).
92 As Scharf notes, in at least two instances the United States has evoked the Lotus principle to justify criminal
prosecutions. Scharf, supra note 26, at 20-21. In the Hadamar trial, the United States argued that “the principle of the Lotus
Case, applied to the case before this Commission, means that the jurisdiction of the Commission, as a question of international
law, need be denied only upon a showing that there is a generally accepted rule of international law which would prohibit the
exercise of such jurisdiction.” Charles H. Taylor, Memorandum, Has the Commission Jurisdiction to Hear and Determine the
Hadamar Case?, U.S. JAGD Document (declassified on June 19, 1979). Similarly, before the International Court of Justice the
United States argued “It is a fundamental principle of international law that restrictions on states cannot be presumed but must be
found in conventional law specifically accepted by them or in customary law generally accepted by the community of nations.”
Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America, Before the International Court of Justice, Request by the
United Nations General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, June 20,
1995, at 8.
93 Justice Scalia has referred to this as “prescriptive comity.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The ‘comity’ they refer to is not the comity of courts, whereby judges decline to exercise jurisdiction
over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere, but rather what might be termed ‘prescriptive comity’: the respect
sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws.”).
94 See infra, text accompanying notes 191-192.
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B. The political nature of “exorbitant jurisdiction”
Opponents to the ICC’s consent regime begin with the contextual argument that no treaty can
create third party beneficiary without the consent of ratifying states.95 They argue that the Rome Statute
modifies the legal rights of states without their consent because states have a legal interest and right to see
their nationals free from exorbitant jurisdiction.96 As one author has noted “[e]xorbitant jurisdiction can
be defined as those assertions of jurisdiction that are not generally recognized by accepted principles of
international law.”97 Whether or not a form of jurisdiction is “exorbitant” is essentially a value judgment
made by each individual state. The notion of “exorbitant jurisdiction” is a term of art, not a rule of
custom.98 That is to say, every state has different perceptions of exorbitance.99 The exercise of
jurisdiction is a sovereign act with significant effects on foreign relations and domestic public policy. As
the result of different legal values, States naturally have different perceptions of illegality, or
exorbitance.100 Thus, classification of another states exercise of jurisdiction as “exorbitant” cannot be an
argument based on custom or principle of international law. Rather it is an argument based purely on
domestic public policy. To that extent, a state cannot have an internationally recognized interest in seeing
their nationals free from “exorbitant jurisdiction” insofar as it would allow all States of nationality to
block any exercise of jurisdiction by territorial States that they disagreed with. As such, there is a
difference between “exorbitant jurisdiction” and jurisdiction violating principles of customary
international law.
In the realm of private international law, States use the notion of “exorbitant jurisdiction” to
prevent enforcement of foreign judgments decided on grounds objectionable to public policy. For
example, most countries do not enforce judgments where the United States has exercised general
jurisdiction on the basis of systematic and continuous contacts.101 Similarly, the Brussels Regulation on
Jurisdiction stipulates domestic forms of jurisdiction that are not recognized as between state parties to
the Convention.102
Given its subjectivity, it is hard to see that states have a “legal interest” to see their nationals free
from exorbitant jurisdiction. Rather, assertions against exorbitance are more properly classified as
political interests that influence international relations. In fact, to avoid having their nationals being
95 See Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 17, at 26-27; Scheffer, supra note 17, at 3.
96 See Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech.v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 13 (Apr. 6) (holding that “[the] bond of nationality
between the State and the individual . . . confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection.”); see also Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Co. Ltd. [Barcelona Traction] (Second Phase) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); Panevezys-Saldutiskis
Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. 1, (ser. A/B), at 357 (Feb. 28); BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 406.
97 John Fitzpatrick, The Lugano Convention and Western European Integration: A Comparative Analysis of
Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe and the United States, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 695, 703 n.34 (1993).
98 Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 142.
99 Kathryn A. Russell, Exorbitant Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: The Brussels System as an Impetus for
United States Action, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 57, 58 (1993) (“Exorbitant jurisdiction is jurisdiction validly exercised
under the jurisdictional rules of a state that nevertheless appears unreasonable to non-nationals because of the grounds used to
justify jurisdiction.”).
100 Jurisdiction itself is defined in personal terms. n the United States, the due process clause which contains
perspectives on US morality also limits the permissible limits on jurisdiction. Thus by casting jurisdiction in constitutional terms,
exorbitancy is similarly a judgment based exclusively on US perceptions of due process. See Lee Scott Taylor, Note,
Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (2003).
101 See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 114-16 (1999);
Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons for American
Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 133-36 (1992).
102 Amongst the black listed juridical provisions in the Brussels Regulation are: Article 14 of French Civil Code (Code
civil): which provides that a French national can sue an alien in the French courts. Similar provisions in Luxemburg (Arts. 14, 15
of Code civil) and Belgium (Article 15 of Code civil/Burgerlijk Wetboek); Article 4 of Italian Civil Code (Act 218 of 31 May
1995) which had effect of making Italian nationals subject to jurisdiction in Italy regardless of their domicile or the cause of
action; Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) which permits suit in Germany solely on the
basis of presence of defendant’s property in the judicial district where suit was brought. In Ireland and UK: jurisdiction on the
basis of personal service on the defendant during his temporary presence in the UK is also considered exorbitant. See also
Russell, supra note 99, at 78-80.
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caught in the net of another state’s “exorbitant” jurisdiction, states often agree to bi-lateral and multi-
lateral arrangements.103 In order words, there seems to be concession that states are relinquishing aspects
of their sovereignty by agreeing not to exercise jurisdiction in areas which foreign states consider
exorbitant. Thus, arrangements are only enforceable between the state parties. This is equally evident in
the European Union where entities and individuals not domiciled in the European Union may be subject
to litigation based on heads of jurisdiction recognized as “exorbitant” and “impermissible” against any
domiciliary of the European Union.
III. JURISDICTION AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Even assuming that states have a legal interest in seeing their nationals free from exorbitant
jurisdiction, there is no rule under international law prohibiting states from exercising “exorbitant”
jurisdiction. First, under customary international law all States have the right to exercise jurisdiction over
criminal acts committed on their territory and universal jurisdiction over international crimes. Second,
exercise of jurisdiction over international crimes does not require the consent of the state of nationality as
long as the tenets of due process are recognized. Each of these arguments provides a basis for justifying
the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over non-party nationals when the alleged conduct is on the territory of
a state party.
A. Jurisdiction under international criminal law
Assuming, arguendo, that the Lotus principle does not apply, the question is whether the ICC’s
exercise of jurisdiction is grounded in customary international law. There are different legal grounds of
jurisdiction that have been widely used by states for both purposes of prescriptions and enforcement. 104
Relatively few, however, have reached the status of “custom.” In international criminal law, five legal
grounds of jurisdiction have been applied by states and are generally accepted: subjective and objective
territoriality, active and passive personality, and universality.105
Subjective territoriality jurisdiction permits a state to exercise state sovereignty over conduct
committed within its territory regardless of the offenders nationality.106 Objective territoriality
jurisdiction, also known as the protective principle or “effects” jurisdiction, allows the state to exercise
jurisdiction over conduct abroad that may affect a states territorial interest.107 Active nationality
jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction a states nationals or residents regardless of where the conduct was
103 Scharf, supra note 26, at 75. (“When the territorial state prosecutes such persons, the state of the nationality of the
accused may seek to intercede diplomatically on the basis of comity, but it has no legal right under international law to induce the
territorial state to refrain from prosecuting or to impel it to agree to resort to interstate dispute resolution.”)
104 The distinction between these two are generally regarded as prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. The latter
referring to a states ability to criminalize certain conduct and the former referring to the states enforcement powers. See
BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 297.
105 See generally Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29
AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 86, §§402-404 (1987);
WILLIAM BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES & MATERIALS 531, 551-52 (3d ed. 1971); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 421 (3d ed. 1993); CASSESE, supra note 4, at 277.
106 See Harvard Research, supra note 105, at 480; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 86, § 403.
107 See Harvard Research, supra note 105, at 543; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 86, § 402(3); Board of Trade v.
Owens, 1957 AC 602, 634; State of Arizona v. Willoughby, 114 I.L.M. 586 (Arizona). The most common application of this
principle is in US anti-trust cases in which US courts have exercised jurisdiction over anti-competitive conduct committed abroad
because of the effect on the US economy. Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (justifying exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs which conspired abroad to affect insurance coverage and rates in the US.); see also The Wood
Pulp Case, [1988] E.C.R. 5193 (extraterritorial application of EU Competition law over the formation of a cartel outside of the
European Union which sought to affect prices within it.); S.S. Lotus case, supra note 77, at 18 (validating the objective
territoriality principal under customary international law); BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 304.
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committed,108 whereas passive nationality jurisdiction over conduct that affects the interests of their
nationals.109 Lastly, a number of states have adopted statutes enabling their courts to exercise jurisdiction
over some crimes regardless of nationality or territoriality under the principle of “universality.”110
Universal jurisdiction is legitimized where the nature of the crime creates a legal right, if not obligation,
in all states to exercise jurisdiction over the act.111
Opponents to the Rome Statute argue that the ICC’s jurisdiction does not reflect any of the
traditional bases of criminal jurisdiction.112 That is to say that the ICC does not exercise actual territorial
or nationality jurisdiction, but rather delegated territorial or national jurisdiction.113 Because the
delegation of territorial, nationality, or universal jurisdiction substantially affects its characteristics,
delegated jurisdiction does not continue the widespread acceptance that actual jurisdiction has received.114
108 See Harvard Research, supra note 105, at 519-23; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 86, § 402(2); BROWNLIE, supra
note 53, at 303. For example, the Protect Act allows US courts to exercise jurisdiction over US residents and citizens for
violating provisions on illegal sexual contact with minors abroad. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(b)(1) (2003).
109 Probably the most famous articulation of the passive personality principle is found in the French Criminal Code. See
CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 689-1 [Penal Code] (1988) (“Any foreigner who, outside the territory of the
Republic, commits a felony, either as perpetrator, or as accomplice, may be prosecuted and tried according to French law, when
the victim of this felony is of French nationality.”) translated in THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Gerald L. Kock &
Richard S. Frase trans., rev. ed.) (1988). Out of all the theories of jurisdiction listed above, the passive personality principle has
received the most amount of criticism, particularly since it conflicts with theories of territoriality and active personality which are
more vested in notions of state sovereignty. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 303; Harvard Research, supra note 105, at 579;
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 86, § 402 cmt. g; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 30(2) (1965).
110 See generally Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs,
2001); see also Harvard Research, supra note 105, at 563; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 86, § 404; BROWNLIE, supra note 53,
at 304. Article 23 of the Spanish 1985 Law on Judicial Power provides that Spanish courts have jurisdiction over crimes
committed outside of Spain if they constitute crimes which Spain is obligated to prosecute under custom or international treaties,
Sentence of the Constitutional Tribunal of Spain in the Guatemala Genocide Case, Second Chamber of the Constitutional
Tribunal, Sep. 26, 2005, obtainable at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/tcgtm1.html; Decision of the Audiencia
Nacional (Sala de lo penal) of 13 December 2000 (genocide in Guatemala), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf (last
visited Feb. 21, 2006).
Article 6 of the German Penal Code, which provides for universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes even when the crime has been committed abroad and has no link to Germany, Code of Crimes Against
International Law, sec. 153f, available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/frames/eng/service/legislation_plans/10000582/index.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
Prior to legislative restrictions imposed by the Belgian legislature in 2003, the Law of 16 June 1993 permitted Belgian
courts to have jurisdiction over grave breaches to the 1949 Geneve Conventions no matter where the offences were committed or
by whom. See Loi relative à la repression des violations graves de droit international humanitaire, Art. 3 §§ A-B (1999),
published in Moniteur Belge, Mar. 23, 1999. Belgium’s new law now requires either the presence of the defendant or that the
victim either be Belgian or have resided in Belgium for at least three years when the alleged crimes took place. 5 August 2003
Act on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, Moniteur Belge, 7 Aug. 2003, pp. 40506 et. seq.
For more cases and discussion on the application of universal jurisdiction see also Gabriel Bottini, Universal
Jurisdiction After the Creation of the International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 503 (2004); Bartram S. Brown,
The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383, 321-92 (2001); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy
Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 183 (2004); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal
Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (2001).
111 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 5); Sentence of the
Constitutional Tribunal of Spain in the Guatemala Genocide Case, Second Chamber of the Constitutional Tribunal, Sep. 26,
2005, available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/tcgtm1.html; see also BASSIOUNI & WISE, AUT DEDERE, AUT
JUDICARE, supra note 19, at 34; Bassiouni, Obligatio Erga Omnes, supra note 67, at 63; G.C. ROZANKIS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS
COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES (1976); ANDRE DE HOOGH, OBLIGATION ERA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (1996).
112 See Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 17, at 26-27.
113 See id.; Madeline Morris, Terrorism: The Politics of Prosecution, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 405, 417 (2005); Madeline
Morris, Terrorism and Unilateralism: Criminal Jurisdiction and International Relations, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 473, 485 (2004)
[hereinafter Terrorism and Unilateralism].
114 David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 65-66
(2001-02).
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Subsequently, while states do have a right under customary international law to exercise jurisdiction over
non-nationals who commit crimes on their territory, delegation of that authority to an international court
has not reached the level of customary international law absent the consent of the state of nationality.115
Whether or not the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction comports with norms of customary
international law depends on the theory of jurisdiction underlying the Rome Statute. Subsequently, there
are two fundamental questions that need to be addressed on whether the jurisdiction of the ICC is
“universal” or consent-based, and alternatively whether either is reflective of customary international
law.116 In other words, there are two independent issues: first, whether universal jurisdiction over non-
state actors for the crimes under the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction are reflective of customary
international law. Secondly, whether exercise of territorial jurisdiction by the ICC is a delegation of state
authority, and if so, whether it is customary.
i. The Rome Statute and the Universality Theory of Jurisdiction
1. The Continuing Importance of Universal Jurisdiction under the Rome
Statute
The negotiating history of the Rome Statute indicates that the consent regime was layered upon
the ICC jurisdiction, such that without the consent of states under article 12, the court does not have the
authority to exercise jurisdiction.117 The inclusion of article 12 precludes any discussion of universality
since the framers clearly did not intend the ICC to be exercising universal jurisdiction.118 However, a
number of proponents to the Rome Statute continue to argue that universal jurisdiction justifies the ICC’s
exercise of jurisdiction over non-party nationals for a number of reasons.119 First, the Rome Statute
authorizes the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over non-party nationals where the Security Council has
referred the matter under its Chapter VII powers.120 Assumingly, therefore, if there is no territorial or
nationality nexus the ICC would inevitably be exercising universal jurisdiction. Yet, even opponents to
the Rome Statute do not dispute the validity of the ICC’s authority over persons referred to them by the
Security Council.
Second, the territoriality and nationality requirements are self-imposed limitations. By its very
definition, universal jurisdiction is not limited to states.121 The very notion of universal jurisdiction
115 Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 17, at 29 (“Customary international law evolves as a reflection
of the consent or acquiescence of states over time. Because consent to universal jurisdiction exercised by states is not equivalent
to consent to delegated universal jurisdiction exercised by an international court, the customary law affirming the universal
jurisdiction of states cannot be considered equivalent to customary law affirming the delegability of that jurisdiction to an
international court.”)
116 Leila N. Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J.
381, 410 (2000)
117 See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating
Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 10 (1999).
118 A number of scholars have documented that proposals by a small number of states seeking to ground the ICC’s
jurisdiction on universality were expressly rejected by the majority of states in the preparatory committee. See The Jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court: An Informal Discussion Paper Submitted by Germany, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 249/1998/DP. 2
(1998); Christopher K. Hall, The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 92 A.J.I.L. 124, 131 (1998); Christopher K. Hall, The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 A.J.I.L. 548, 549-50 (1998) (detailing the German
proposal during the preparatory committee calling for universal jurisdiction); Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International
Criminal Law?, 93 A.J.I.L. 452, 456 (1999); Morris, Terrorism and Unilateralism, supra note 113, at 481; David J. Scheffer, The
United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 A.J.I.L. 12, 17-18 (1999).
119 See Scharf, supra note 26, at 80; Sadat & Carden, supra note 116, at 410-14.
120 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 13(b).
121 See Darryl Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 57 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (“Universal jurisdiction, and even
international prosecution if necessary, is justified by the scale and gravity of these atrocities and the involvement of a state or
organization.”)
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means that all entities can exercise authority over the alleged conduct and accused as long as it comports
with notions of due process. The universality theory is a catchall meant to prevent impunity for a select
number of crimes that are ex jure gentium. Thus, the territoriality, nationality, and complimentarity
requirements are conditions voluntarily imposed by states despite the “full range of jurisdiction available
to them under customary international law.”122
Lastly, some scholars have argued that universal jurisdiction has been delegated to the ICC by
individual states.123 Under customary international law, states can exercise jurisdiction over international
crimes that have risen to the level of jus cogens. Subsequently, the authority over persons subject to state
jurisdiction has been delegated to an international court under the theory of universality. In justifying
delegated universal jurisdiction, a number of scholars point to the history of the Nuremburg trial and
Tokyo trials.124 In sum, although the Rome Statute is not grounded on universal jurisdiction, the
abovementioned arguments require analysis of the customary status of universal jurisdiction as embodied
in the Rome Statute.
2. The Rome Statute’s Embodiment of Customary Principles on
Universality
Following World War II, many scholars argued that the existence of jus cogens crimes paved the
way for a universal obligation to prosecute, or at least a right to do so.125 Multi-lateral conventions and
treaties were drafted, crystallizing the early framework for universal obligations and duties.126 Both the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, as well as the passage of the Geneva Conventions, reflected consensus
amongst states that there existed crimes which by their grave nature, inherently carried obligations shared
by all states.127 Moreover, the gradual development of international and hybrid courts as well as the
territorial expansion of treaty-body commissions is reflective of the progressive importance of universal
promotion of human rights and criminal accountability. Thus, as Professor Bassiouni states, “the growth
of international criminal law has expanded the application of the universality theory of jurisdiction.”128
The idea that universal jurisdiction is granted to crimes of an international character is that “even
if it occurred outside its territory, even if it has been perpetrated by a non-national, and even if its
nationals have not been harmed by [it].”129 The character of the crimes under the ICC’s subject matter
jurisdiction have largely been considered universal and a threat to “international peace and security.”130
122 See Scharf, supra note 26, at 77 ( “the drafters did not view the consent of the state of territoriality or nationality as
necessary as a matter of international law to confer jurisdiction on the court. Rather, they adopted the consent regime as a limit to
the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction as a politically expedient concession to the sovereignty of states in order to garner
broad support for the statute.”)
123 Charney, supra note 118, at 456 fn. 29. (“If a state has universal jurisdiction over a suspect, it may choose to
prosecute that person in its domestic courts or to delegate that authority to other courts, including the ICC (assuming relevant
human rights are protected.”); Nicolaos Strapatsas, Universal Jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court, 29 MAN. L.J. 1,
7-11 (2002).
124 See infra, text accompanying notes 181-195.
125 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 67, at 367.
126 As Edward Wise and Cherif Bassiouni note, the earliest codification of the duty to extradite or prosecute emerged in
the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, Apr. 20, 1929, 112 L.N.T.S. 371, see generally
BASSIOUNI & WISE, AUT DEDERE, AUT JUDICARE, supra note 19. Between the first and second World Wars two other agreements
were additionally drafted, imposing the duty to extradite or prosecute: the Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in
Dangerous Drugs, art. 7, 8, June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299 and the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism,
art. 9, 10, 19, Nov. 16, 1937, L.N.O.J. 23 (1938).
127 See generally Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes, supra note 90, at 81.
128 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 67, at 367. A number of scholars have documented the
overwhelming evidence that indicates that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is allowed by customary international law.
CASSESE, supra note 4, at 293-95; Even critics to the Rome Statute do not dispute the validity of universal jurisdiction to
international crimes.
129 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT, 57 (1994)
130 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Cess., at 20, U.N. Doc. S/INF50 (1996); Statement of France, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3453 (1994); Statement of the Czech Republic, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd
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However, some scholars have attacked this presumption. Specifically, US Ambassador David Scheffer
and Professor of international law, Madeline Morris, have argued that “not all of the crimes within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Court in fact enjoy universal jurisdiction under customary international
law” and:
“…it is implausible for a state party or a consenting non-party state to delegate to a
treaty-based international court the right to prosecute a mixture of crimes, some of which
in a domestic setting are crimes of universal jurisdiction but other of which, even in a
domestic setting, are not crimes of universal jurisdiction.”131
There is some validity to this argument. The Rome Statute enables the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over
war crimes in non-international armed conflicts under Art. 8(2)(c). A number of scholars have largely
contested the customary status of universal jurisdiction over war crimes in a non-international armed
conflict. In fact, the appellate chamber for the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) noted in Prosecutor v. Tadic that States ratifying the Geneva Convention did not want to extend
universal jurisdiction to non-international armed conflicts in order to preserve national sovereignty.132
Subsequently, the ICC would not have universal jurisdiction over crimes committed in a non-international
armed conflict.
However, the Rome Statute is the product of a collaborative effort by states to specifically define
custom and is evidence of state practice. In addition, the vast majority of scholars and courts have held
that the four crimes under the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC are jus cogens norms, thus satisfying
the opinio juris.133 As Dr. Leila Sadat notes, “The Rome Statute embodies prescriptive norms for the
international community as a matter of substantive criminal law.”134
Universal jurisdiction is an extension of the duty to extradite or prosecute.135 Under contemporary
international law, the state of nationality has no right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over acts
committed by its nationals abroad.136 In accordance with this fundamental principle of international law, a
court may exercise jurisdiction against any individual unless it can be shown that this violates a
prohibitive rule of international law.137 The duty to extradite or prosecute set out in the four Geneva
Conventions, by virtue of the common article regarding the repression of “grave breaches,” is regarded as
a customary obligation.138 As defined in the Conventions “grave breaches” includes serious violations of
the laws of war; by which is subsequently considered a violation of the “laws of nations” and jus
mtg. at 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3453 (1994); Statement of the United Kingdom, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 6, U.N.
Doc. S/PV 3453 (1994); Statement of China, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3453 (1994); Statement
of Pakistan, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3453 (1994); see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 21 (2001).
131 Scheffer Address, supra note 20, at 3; Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 17, at 28
132 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-
94-1-AR72, decision of Oct. 2, 1995, at 80-83.
133 Scharf, supra note 26, at 80; Sadat & Carden, supra note 116, at 406-07; Theodor Meron, International
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 555 (1995).
134 Sadat & Carden, supra note 116, at 406; see also Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime under International
Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 427, 437 (2003) (arguing that the :crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are crimes under customary
international law and subject to universal jurisdiction”).
135 BASSIOUNI & WISE, AUT DEDERE, AUT JUDICARE, supra note 19, at 20, 43-44.
136 Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objection to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L & POL. 855, 871 (1999).
137 S.S. Lotus case, supra note 77, at 18; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
ICJ Rep. 52; Hadamar Trial, 1 L. Rep. Of Trials of War Criminals 46 (1949).
138 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Art. 49; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, Art. 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Art. 129; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Art. 146; Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, Art. 85; and Relating to the Protection of Victims and Armed Conflicts, June 10, 1977, 16 I.LM. 1391 (1977).
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cogens.139 Consequently, a State’s refusal to extradite or punish a person accused or convicted of war
crimes and “crimes against humanity” is contrary to the United Nations Charter and to generally
recognized norms of international law.140 In such that war crimes are crimes ex jure gentium, they are thus
triable by the courts of all States.141 Subsequently, national courts would have the power to exercise
jurisdiction over non-state nationals.142 Under this theory, the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction would be
reflective of current customary norms allowing universal jurisdiction for crimes considered a as a threat to
mankind.
ii. The Territoriality theory and the Rome Statute
The territorial principle is one of the oldest and well-established theories of jurisdiction in
criminal law. As Christopher Blakesley notes, “[c]riminal law may be said to be rooted in the conception
of law enforcement as a means of keeping peace within the territory.”143 The notion that states have
jurisdiction over all conduct within their territory regardless of the offender’s nationality is a direct
extension of state sovereignty.144 As Professor Ian Brownlie notes, “[t]he principal corollaries of the
sovereignty and equality of states are: (1) a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the
permanent population living there; (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of
other states.”145 While states may have legal interests regarding their nationals, those interests are not
exclusive when the national’s conduct is abroad.146 Those interests, however, may be concurrent with the
territorial state.147
139 Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; Tadic, supra note 132, at 96-137, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702
(1986).
140 Principles of International Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, GA Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 78, UN Doc. A/9030, Dec.
3, 1973; GA Res. 2840, (XXVI) 26 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 28), at 88, UN Doc A/8429 (1971).
141 Judgment 461, 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals, (1948), reprinted in 41 AJIL 172, 216 (1947); The Charter and
Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal, UN Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949); The Hostage Case, United States v. List et al., 11 CCL Trials
(1948) at 1241; Almelo Trial, 1 L. Rep. of Trials of War Criminals 35, 42 (1949); In re Eisentrager, 14 L. Rep. of Trials of War
Criminals 8, 15 (1949); The Eichmann Case, Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 ILR 18, 39, (Isr. Dist. Ct. – Jerusalem
1961), aff’d, 36 ILR 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962) at 50.
142 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, Art. 6; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. 8532, art. 3; Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 7, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46, art. 5.
143 Christopher L. Blakesley, Brief Overview of the Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 33, 43 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
144 See The Schooner Exch. V. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (“The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own
territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself…All exceptions, therefore,
to the full and complete power of a nation, within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.”); The
Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123 (1825); ROGER MERLE & ANDRE VITU, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CRIMINEL 371 (4th ed. 1989) (describing
traditional territory principle in civil law countries as “affirm[ing] the territoriality of criminal law (lex loci delicti) is to proclaim
that penal law applies to all individuals whatever their nationality or that of their victims, who have committed an offence on the
territory of the State in which the law is in force…); BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 298.
145 BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 287.
146 See Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 855, 870 (1999). As Professor Scharf notes, “When the territorial state prosecutes such persons, the
state of the nationality of the accused may seek to intercede diplomatically on the basis of comity, but it has no legal right under
international law to induce the territorial state to refrain from prosecuting or to impel it to agree to resort to interstate dispute
resolution.” Scharf, supra note 26, at 75.
147 The question, therefore, is whether concurrent jurisdiction by non-party states is a legal right modified by the Rome
Statute. The principle of complementarity codified in Article 17 makes this issue moot since it preserves concurrent jurisdiction,
and gives it deference, to “a State which has jurisdiction over [the conduct or perpetrator], unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” See Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17; Case of the Monetary Gold
Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32 (June 15) [hereinafter Monetary Gold]; Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 18; Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America (U.S. v. U.S.S.R
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The rejoinder to this argument is that the ICC does not possess “territory” per se. Territorial
jurisdiction is an extension of a State’s territorial sovereignty. Without territorial interests, it is hard to
believe that the ICC is exercising actual territorial jurisdiction akin to that of national states. Opponents
to the Rome Statute argue that the ICC is exercising delegated jurisdiction.148 Proponents of the ICC
sidestep this argument. As Professor Bassiouni notes:
“The ICC is not a substitute for national criminal jurisdiction and does not supplant
national criminal justice systems, but rather is ‘complementary’ to them.149 The ICC
does no more than what each and every state in the international community can do under
existing international law. It is an expression of collective action by states parties to a
treaty that establish an institution to carry out justice for certain international crimes. The
ICC is therefore an extension of national criminal jurisdiction.”150
However, even Bassiouni’s argument falls short. Even if the ICC is not a substitute and is co-terminus
with state rights under traditional doctrines of jurisdiction, the exercise of jurisdiction by an international
court has long been treated differently than the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts.
The basis of jurisdiction in public international law relies almost strictly on the consent of the
adjudicating parties.151 This requirement drastically distinguishes cases arising in international courts and
those in national settings.152 Even in the context of private disputes by individuals alleging human rights
violations against states, regional human rights courts have required consent before possessing
jurisdiction over controversies. The International Court of Justice has even inferred that in cases alleging
peremptory norms of international law, the jurisdiction of international court adjudicating disputes
involving sovereign state interests is still subject to the consent of those states whose interests are
impacted.153 Therefore, there is a strong presumption against the exercise of jurisdiction by international
courts absent consent.
However, this argument again, presumes that there is a legal interest owned to states of
nationality that is being violated. In the Case Concerning East Timor, the ICJ refused to exercise
jurisdiction because determining a dispute between Portugal and Australia over the non-self governing
territory of East Timor would impact the legal interests of Indonesia, a third party who had not consented
to the Court’s jurisdiction.154 Following the departure of Portuguese forces from East Timor, Indonesia
unlawfully occupied the area and concluded a treaty with Australia regarding the delimitation of the
continental shelf.155 The Court concluded that Portugal’s claim “cannot be assessed without first entering
into the question why it is that Indonesia could not lawfully have concluded the 1989 Treaty, while
Portugal allegedly could have done so.”156 Similarly, in the Case of Monetary Gold Removed from Rome
), 1954 I.C.J. 103 (July 12); Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953 (U.S. v. Czech Rep.), 1956 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of
7 October 1952 (U.S. v. USSR ), 1956 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 14). The principle of diplomatic protection confers the right on states to
bring claims on behalf of their nationals for alleged breaches of international law. The principle does not grant states exclusive
jurisdiction over their nationals. Such principle would be antithetical to international customs relating to criminal jurisdiction and
territoriality. While one can argue that states of nationality and territoriality contain concurrent jurisdiction, there is no
established hierarchy that would grant states of nationality rights antecedent to territorial states. Even if a hierarchy of
jurisdiction existed, it would almost certainly sway in favour of territorial states.
148 See supra, text accompanying notes 112-115.
149 Rome Statute, supra note14, at arts. 1, 17.
150 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 67, at 500.
151 Monetary Gold, supra note 147, at 32; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 18; Treatment in Hungary of
Aircraft and Crew of United States of America (U.S. v. U.S.S.R ), 1954 I.C.J. 103 (July 12); Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953
(U.S. v. Czech Rep.), 1956 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952 (U.S. v. USSR ), 1956 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 14).
152 See infra, text accompanying notes 191-192.
153 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) 1996 ICJ Rep.
52, (holding that the character of State obligation and the gravity of the crime are distinct from questions of jurisdiction. ); Case
Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 120 (June 30), para. 29 [hereinafter East Timor] (stating that “the erga
omnes character of an obligation and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things”).
154 East Timor, supra note 153.
155 Id. at 94.
156 Id. at 102.
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in 1943, the ICJ held that Albania held title to gold that was in dispute by a number of countries.157 As
such, Albania’s “legal interests would ... form the very subject-matter of the decision.”158 The Court
declined to exercise jurisdiction because Albania did not consent to its jurisdiction.159
States of nationality are not a necessary party to disputes involving the state of territoriality and
the accused. The state of territoriality can exercise jurisdiction with or without the consent of the
nationality state.160 More importantly, the state of territoriality has the right to choose which forum to
adjudicate the criminal under as long as principles of due process are comported with. The territorial
principle is based off the exclusive rights of states to adjudicate disputes within their borders, however
they wish, so long as it is consistent with norms of international human rights.161 Subsequently, if the
state of nationality has no right to prevent jurisdiction by the state of territoriality, nor does it have that
right when the state of territoriality removes the case to an international court.
B. The status of “consent” based jurisdiction
Opponents to the Rome Statute, however, argue that jurisdiction to the ICC is delegated and not
actual.162 Even if the state of territoriality does not require consent by the state of nationality, the same
cannot be said when judicial authority is delegated to an international body. In light of general principles
of international law limiting the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction by international courts, whenever any
legal interest by a state is affected the ICC must have that state’s consent. The question opponents to the
Rome Statute ask is whether each basis of jurisdiction stipulated under Article 13 of the Rome Statute,
comports with the consent requirement.163
i. Consent-based jurisdiction through the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers
Consent-based jurisdiction over non-party nationals can be theoretically conferred by the Security
Council under its Chapter VII powers. Article 24 of the UN Charter charges the Security Council with
recognizing and responding to threats to international peace and security.164 As such, the Security
Council is the only UN body with legal authority to bind all member states.165 Pursuant to Article 48 of
the UN Charter, all states which have ratified the UN Charter have consented ipso facto to any action by
the Security Council to “maintain international peace and security” including the establishment of
international criminal tribunals.166 Subsequently, acts taken by the Security Council to create criminal
tribunals under Chapter VII confers binding consent by all parties to the UN Charter.167 Thus, when the
Security Council decided to pass a resolution creating the ICTY and ICTR under its Chapter VII powers,
it did so with the consent of all nation-states who had ratified the Charter.168
157 Monetary Gold, supra note 147, at 32.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921 (1984) (“because "the prerogative of
a nation to control and regulate activities within its boundaries is an essential definitional element of sovereignty.”)
161 See Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.), at 1095-96 (“The common law regarding
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is firmly anchored in the principle of territoriality as interpreted and
applied by the English courts in the 19th Century... . This principle reflects the fact, one of the basic tenets of international law,
that sovereign states have exclusive jurisdiction in their own territory.”);
162 See supra, text accompanying notes 112-115.
163 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 13.
164 United Nations Charter, supra note 50, at art. 24.
165 Id. at art. 25.
166 Id. at art. 48.
167 See Michael A. Tunks, Note, Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity, 52 DUKE
L.J. 651 (2002) (arguing that state consent to Security Council enabled the ICTY and ICTR to prosecute head of state without
violating the “principle that no head of state may be put on trial without the consent of his home country.”)
168 Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 17, at 36; U.N. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 827 (1993);
U.N. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. (1994)
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In 1993, the Secretary-General’s report setting out the draft Statute of the ICTY, specifically
noted that it was an enforcement measure taken by the Security Council under its Chapter VII powers for
the “restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.”169 Similarly, the ICTR trial chamber noted in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, that by acting under
Chapter VII in creating the tribunal, the Security Council “charges all States with a duty to cooperate fully
with the Tribunal and its organ.”170 As such, the bases of jurisdiction for the two international criminal
tribunals were never founded on universal jurisdiction, per se, but rather the delegation of national
jurisdiction properly evoked through the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers.171 Similarly, the ICC’s
exercise of jurisdiction under article 13(b), referral by the Security Council, is consistent with general
principles of international law.
However, the notion that the ICTY and ICTR function by state consent because they are created
by the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers is not only contentious, but also disputed by the tribunals
themselves. The trial chamber for the ICTY itself distinguishes treaty-based tribunals which are the
“consensual act of nations” with Chapter VII resolutions by the Security Council.172 Treaty-based courts
and commissions, as evidenced by the various regional human rights courts and recent national hybrid
courts, are created as contracts between nations or as between a nation and international organizations.173
While the Security Council operates under the express authority of nations under its Chapter VII powers,
state parties ratifying the UN Charter have different perceptions as to the scope of the Security Council’s
powers. Moreover, the veto power allocated to permanent members dramatically changes the political
structure of all Security Council resolutions. While States enters into treaties on an equal basis, the
Security Council often authorizes resolutions based on political negotiations between permanent
members. Thus, the representative limitations in Security Council resolutions deprives them of the
consensual effect that treaties possess. While this distinction may not invalidate the two tribunals’
jurisdiction, it indicates that the ICTY and ICTR’s jurisdiction may not be based on the conferral of
national consent but rather on the Security Council’s “broad discretion in exercising its authority under
Chapter VII.”174 In either case, there is ample state practice and opinio juris to support the Security
Council’s authority to create an international court and confer jurisdiction to it.175
The ICC differs from the ICTY and ICTR in a number of important respects. First, the ICC was
not a Security Council enforcement measure made under Chapter VII. Rather it is a product of treaty law
whose jurisdiction depends on the specific consent of state parties. To that extent, the ICC, as an
institution, is formed on the consensual act of parties to the Rome Statute. Second, consistent with the
consensual nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction, the Court possesses a principle of “complimentarity.”176 The
169 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc.
S/25704 & Add.l, para. 28 (1993); see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, SC Res.
827, annex, pmbl. (May 25, 1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1203 (1993) (noting that the Statute was passed pursuant to the Security
Council's Chapter VII powers); see also Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in
International Criminal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 784 (2003).
170 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sep. 2, 1998) at para. 2
171 Id.
172 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1 (Aug. 10, 1995) at para. 2, 6-7 (upholding tribunal's
jurisdiction on the basis of Security Council's Chapter VII authority to maintain international peace and security).
173 Aside from the jurisdictional differences between international courts founded on treaties and those created by the
Security Council under Chapter VII, there are also practical differences. A treaty-based court does not have primacy over
domestic proceedings in third states, whereas a court created under chapter VII is legally binding on all member states.
174 Id. at para. 7; see also Statement of the Rapporteur of Committee III/3, Doc. 134, III/3/3, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 785
(1945) (indicating that the drafters of the UN Charter intended “[w]ide freedom of judgment is left as regards the moment [the
Security Council] may choose to intervene and the means to be applied, with sole reserve that it should act 'in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the [United Nations].” The lack of direct state consent may also explain why the two international
tribunals have faced greater difficulty in securing compliance with arrest warrants and requests for information as compared to
treaty committee and courts
175 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Oct. 2, 1995).
176 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at arts. 1, 17.
THE ROME STATUTE AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW [2006]19
ICC may not exercise jurisdiction unless national courts are “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution.”177 Additionally, the ICC may not require national courts to defer to its
competence under any circumstance. The statutes for the ICTR and ICTY, on the other hand, give the
Tribunals “primacy over national court”178 presumably because its powers were conferred to it by the
Security Council under Chapter VII.179 Theoretically, the tribunals may require national courts to confer
jurisdiction over any dispute in which the tribunals may have jurisdictional competence over. Even in
cases where the ICC is referred cases by the Security Council under Chapter VII; there is no provision
that would allow the ICC to exert primacy over national courts. Its provisions on complimentarity would
still bind the ICC. Third, the ICC’s jurisdictional limitation is not co-terminus to that of the Security
Council, even when a case is referred to it under Art. 13(b). On the other hand, the ICTY and ICTR’s
jurisdiction are limited by the Security Council’s jurisdictional limitations. Thus, the Tribunal's
jurisdiction cannot exceed that of the Security Council’s.180
Whether or not referrals to the ICC or the creation of international criminal tribunals, by the
Security Council under Chapter VII represents the “consensual act of nations” does not negate the
jurisdictional validity of such tribunals or referrals. Regardless of how one perceives the power of the
Security Council, there has been widespread acceptance by states inferring that its creation of
international tribunals other is permissible under customary international law. Its delegation of authority
to an independent international criminal court to adjudicate claim would equally be justified under a
moderate perception of the Security Council’s broad powers and its legitimacy under principles of
international law. Subsequently, the legal basis of the ICC under article 13(b) to adjudicate cases referred
to it by the Security Council under its Chapter VII powers seems well grounded, even if not supported
under the traditional principle of consent.
ii. Consent-based jurisdiction by delegation of territorial jurisdiction
More contentious then whether the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction through Security Council
referral is valid under customary international law is whether the delegation of territorial jurisdiction, as
reflected by Article 12(2), is reflective of customary international law. The theory rests on the twin
jurisdictional platforms of the ICC, territory and nationality. Because the Rome Statute is ambiguous as to
whether it is exercising universal jurisdiction or the delegated jurisdiction of states, and the preparatory
documents are silent on the issue, many have argued that the ICC’s jurisdiction a reflection of both.181
Under rules of customary international law, every state clearly has the power to exercise jurisdiction over
177 Id.
178 Art. 8(2), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1600 (1994); Art. 9(2), Statute of the International
Tribunal, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1203
(1993).
179 There are some who argue that the ICTY and ICTR primacy over that of national courts is based on the application
of “universal jurisdiction” see Tadic, at paras. 42 (stating that the crimes in the ICTY statute are “crimes which are universal in
nature, well recognized in international law as serious breaches of international humanitarian law, and transcending the interest of
any one State.”) As Dr. Sadat similarly has noted that the “precedent” established by the two tribunals was extended to the Rome
Statute and “permit[s] the international community as a whole, in certain limited circumstances, to supplement, or even displace,
ordinary national laws of territorial application with international laws that are universal in their thrust and unbounded in their
geographical scope.” See Sadat & Carden, supra note 116, at 407.
180 Appeals Chamber, para. 28. (stating “the Security Council is an organ of an international organization, established
by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organization. . . . Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the
limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention other specific limitations or those which may derive from the
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its nationals or persons who commit acts within its territory.182 The question is whether a state may
delegate that power to an international court, and whether that delegation is equally valid under customary
international law. The practice of both the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals sheds light on this
analysis.183
Opponents argue that the Tokyo and Nuremburg Tribunals are the only international criminal
courts that have exercised jurisdiction without Security Council power and thus serve as a basis for
determining whether consent of the state of nationality was a requirement for adjudication.184 Both the
Tokyo and Nuremburg Tribunals were established following the Second World War in order to provide
legal sanction over the conduct of German and Japanese nationals. However, the tribunals were
established by the major wartime powers, mainly the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union. Both the Nuremburg and Tokyo courts recognized that “[i]n the exercise of their right to create
tribunals for such a purpose [(i.e., for the trial and punishment of war criminals)] and in conferring power
on such tribunals[,] belligerent powers may act only within the limits of international law.”185 Thus,
authority of third states to create jurisdiction over non-nationals was limited by principles of international
law. As Professor John Pritchard notes:
“The legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial…depended not only upon the number and variety of
states that took part in the Trial but more crucially upon the express consent of the
Japanese state to submit itself to the jurisdiction of such a court, relinquishing or at least
sharing a degree or two of sovereignty in the process.”186
While the Japanese government agreed to the prosecution of Japanese nationals before the Tokyo
Tribunal in its Instrument of Surrender,187 the argument is more attenuated with respect to the Nuremberg
Court. The German Reich had never consented to the Nuremberg Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
German nationals. Only if one agreed that the Allies following Berlin Declaration of June 5, 1945,188
acted as the German sovereign, as opposed to occupying states, is an argument of consent tenable.189 Only
by accepting this logic can one conclude, as Professor Morris does, “the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals
each, in different ways, based their jurisdiction on the consent of the state of nationality of the
defendants.”190 As such, consent by the state of nationality is an essential requisite to the exercise of
jurisdiction by any international court, including the ICC.
Morris also argues that there is a significant difference between the exercise of jurisdiction by
states over persons who commit an act within their territories, and the delegation of that jurisdiction to an
182 See supra, text accompanying notes 143-161.
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international court because it would disrupt international relations.191 States allow other states to exercise
jurisdiction over their nationals insofar as there is an option for diplomacy, extradition, and negotiation
would be open between state actors. The process of negotiations and the tools of international relations
are unavailable to a State whose nationals are given to an international court.192 Therefore, the policy that
guided state acceptance of extraterritorial jurisdiction over its nationals is not present where an
international court exercises jurisdiction.
However, this is clear jurisprudence that where the state of nationality or the state of territoriality
does not exercise jurisdiction over criminals who commit international crimes, that it is the obligation of
all nation states to prevent immunity and promote prosecution.193 This concept is an extension of the
Nuremburg principle that “states may do together what any one of them could do separately.”194
Therefore, where one state may exercise jurisdiction over a non-national for crimes committed on their
territory, so can states agree to enable an international court to do the same. There is nothing in customary
international law that prevents countries or courts from exercising jurisdiction over non-nationals where
they have committed crimes on their territory.195
CONCLUSION
The principle of pacta tertiis should not inhibit an international body from exercising jurisdiction
over a criminal legally arrested by a state having proper jurisdiction. If anything, the principle simply
prevents the provisions on state obligations under the Rome Statute from having any bearing against non-
party states. Thus, for example, the Rome Statute can not create a legal basis requiring cooperation from
non-party states, including extradition, mutual legal assistance, transfer of proceedings, etc.196
At best, it is unclear as to whether the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over a non-party national
would affect the legal interests of that state. No state has exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct of their
nationals committed in other states. While recognizing permissible grounds to prescribe jurisdiction over
the conduct of nationals abroad, the United States has never considered such jurisdiction to be
exclusive.197 If anything, states arguably have greater claims to jurisdiction over conduct within their
territory, including exercising the discretion to prosecute the offender before an international body.
The ICC was established to prevent impunity by reinvigorating national institutions. It is the
culmination of historical lessons that teach against non-cooperation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals
along with the tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia were built for the precise purpose of accounting for
crimes which transcend national borders. Objections to the Rome Statute, based on national interests and
sovereignty fail in light of the crimes sought to be prevented by an International Criminal Court. Without
the safety net provided by international cooperation and prevention of crimes, the world risks facing the
dangers it promised “never again” to allow.198
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